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On July 14, 1966, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held Missouri's crimi-
nal appellate procedure for the appointment of counsel on appeal for indigent
criminal defendants unconstitutional.3 On August 23, 1966, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the initial decision
was to be applied with absolute retroactivity in this state.4 It is the intent of this
article to discuss these decisions, their background, and purpose.
I. THE CASES
In 1961, Bosler was tried and convicted in the City of St. Louis of robbery in
the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon. He was properly
treated as an indigent criminal defendant. Trial counsel, appointed by the court,
prepared and filed defendant's motion for a new trial, and, when denied, prepared
the notice of appeal.5 Prior to the preparation and certification of the transcript
for appeal, Bosler, pro se, filed a rule 27.266 motion to vacate sentence, and this
motion was also denied. In the rule 27.26 motion, Bosler alleged that his con-
stitutional rights had been violated in that the trial court had not appointed
counsel to aid him in the preparation and presentation of his appeal.7 In April
of 1963, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Bosler's conviction.8 In rejecting
the challenge based on a lack of counsel on appeal, the court chose to disregard
1. 363 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1966). Since the text of this article was prepared,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3320 (U.S. March 14,
1967). The per curiam opinion follows that of the Court of Appeals. In addition,
the Court noted that the "right to be furnished counsel does not depend upon a
request," citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962). This issue was
apparently first raised in the state's petition for certiorari.
2. 258 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
3. Bosler v. Swenson, supra note 1.
4. Donnell v. Swenson, supra note 2.
5. State v. Bosler, 366 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. 1963).
6. Sup. Ct. Rule 27.26 provides in effect that a prisoner in custody under
sentence may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on a
variety of grounds, including violation of constitutional rights, with the trial court.
The rule authorizes the trial court to take appropriate action.
7. State v, Bosler, supra note 5, at 373.
8. State v. Bosler, s-upra note 5.
(230)
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Douglas v. California,9 decided March 18, 1963. The court noted only that under
Supreme Court Rules 28.02 and 27.20, it considers all allegations of error pre-
served by the motion for new trial where the appellant does not file a brief. "Such
procedure adequately protects the defendant's rights."' 0 Bosler sought habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
That court initially denied the application.11 The court of appeals reversed and
ordered the defendant released if the state failed to act to grant the defendant
a new appeal within ninety days.12 The Eighth Circuit's opinion complimented
Missouri for its forward treatment of indigent criminals, and then stated its
legal conclusion that the Missouri procedure fell short of the constitutional
standard adopted in Douglas.'3 The court further found that under familiar princi-
ples of constitutional law, Douglas was to be applied to cases not yet final and that
Bosler fell within the purview of that rule as the affirmation of his conviction
came three weeks after the announcement of Douglas.'4
In 1960, Donnell was convicted in the City of St. Louis of robbery in the
first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon. He too was treated as
an indigent criminal defendant and trial court appointed counsel. Counsel prepared
defendant's motion for a new trial and his notice of appeal.15 In affirming, the
Missouri Supreme Court noted that because of the obvious inadequacy of the
defendant's pro se brief, it had considered all of the assignments of error preserved
in the motion for a new trial as if the defendant had filed no brief, while making
the best use of that brief it could.16 Donnell resorted next to the rule 27.26 mo-
tion to vacate sentence, and for the first time raised the issue of the denial of his
constitutional rights in that the trial court had failed to appoint counsel on his
first appeal knowing that he was an indigent. The trial court denied this motion
and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. 17 The supreme court noted that in
July, 1963, it had amended rule 29.01 to conform to the standard of Douglas
and then stated:
It is probable that as large a percentage of criminal judgments have
been reversed in this Court without counsel, as have been reversed with
counsel. Under these circumstances, we decline to hold, ex post facto,
that this defendant was deprived of any constitutional right because his
trial counsel did not brief and argue the case on appeal or because other
counsel was not appointed to do so.'
8
9. 372 U.S. 353 (1963), holding that an indigent criminal defendant has a
right to counsel on the first appeal a state grants.
10. State v. Bosler, supra note 5, at 373.
11. Bosler v. Swenson, supra note 1, at 155.
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id. at 157.
14. Id. at 158.
15. State v. Donnell, 351 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Mo. 1961).
16. State v. Donnell, supra note 1, at 780. This is consistent with prior deci-
sions of the court. State v. Mace, 295 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1956); State v. Russell, 324
S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1959).
17. State v. Donnell, 387 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Mo. 1965).
18. Id. at 514.
1967]
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No plenary consideration was given to this constitutional issue, nor did the court
recognize another such issue.' 9 The court reaffirmed the position that it had
competence to act as both advocate and impartial tribunal. Donnell sought
habeas corpus, which was granted in an opinion both supporting Bosler and sup-
plying retroactivity to the rule.20
II. THE BACKGROUND
Until the 1930's, the American attitude toward poverty was at best one of
indifference. Our judicial system also had little inclination to protect the rights
of the poor. With the depression and a large increase in the number of poverty
stricken individuals, this indifferent attitude was altered. Murmurs were early
felt in legal circles. Powell v. Alabama2l began the change in 1932, and shortly
thereafter indigent criminal defendants were to be given trial counsel in capital
cases.22 The foundation was thus laid for all that was to later develop in this
area. In 1938, the Supreme Court recognized that the sixth amendment gave
the indigent criminal defendant, in the federal courts, an absolute right to coun-
sel 23 at trial and on appeal. Then in 1941, a major breakthrough in attitude was ex-
pressed in Edwards v. California:
Indigence in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact constitu-
tionally an irrelevance ... .24
The Court had begun to carefully distinguish an individual's constitutional
rights from his guilt and his status as it related to that guilt.
Prior to 1959, however, lower federal courts held unanimously that the failure
of a state to give the indigent aid on appeal and in post-conviction remedies
was not a denial of constitutional rights. 25 These decisions relied on McKane v.
Purston,20 where the Supreme Court decided that appeal from a criminal con-
viction as a matter of right was not required by due process, but was a matter
of discretion which lay with the state legislature. To hold otherwise would be to
recognize explicitly that the system of trial justice which has developed in this
19. The Missouri court refused to grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing as
required by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1964). Donnell v. Swenson,
supra note 2, at 333.
20. Donnell v. Swenson, supra note 2.
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Johnson v. United States, 352
U.S. 565 (1957); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958). However, not all
post-conviction remedies and motions are encompassed by the broad rule. Gershon
v. United States, 243 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1957); Smith v. United States, 216 F.
Supp. 809 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
24. 314 U.S. 160, 179 (1941).
25. See Carr v. Lanagan, 50 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1943); United States v.
Martin, 205 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1953); Mason v. Cranor, 227 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.
1955).
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country is inherently weak and in need of additional checks and balances. It
should be noted that the Supreme Court has recently affirmed this position
tacitly in Thompson v. Louisville.27 Due process did not yet require state aid to
indigent criminal defendants at the appellate level. 28 The equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was still basically restricted to situations of racial
'discrimination, as defined in the Slaughter House Cases.29 In 1951, the Supreme
Court moved forward in Dowd v. United States.30 In a habeas corpus proceeding,
the Court held that the suppression of appeal papers by a warden during the six
month period allowed for appeal constituted a denial of equal protection. The
Court further held that if the state provides appeal to all criminal defendants,
appeal provided to the indigent must meet the standards of due process and
equal protection.8 ' In 1956, the ultimate step was taken in Griffin v. Illinois.3 2 The
Court held that the administration of the statutory criminal appellate procedure
in such a way as to deny "adequate appellate review to the poor" was a
violation of the equal protection and the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution.33 The defendant, an indigent, had requested a free transcript for
the purposes of his appeal. The State refused and required that he pay for the
transcript in advance. On appeal, Illinois conceded that the transcript was
a necessity for an adequate review of the trial, but argued that since it had
the power to withhold the review altogether, it had the power to set the terms
upon which the review could and would be granted 3 4 To a certain extent, the
Court agreed:
But neither the fact that a state may deny the right of appeal altogether
nor the right of a State to make appropriate classifications. . . , nor the
right of a State to lay down conditions it deems appropriate for criminal
appeals, sanctions differentiations by the State that have no relation to
a rational policy of criminal appeal nor authorizes the imposition of con-
ditions that offend the deepest presuppositions of our society.38
The majority equated discrimination on account of poverty and discrimination
on the basis of race. The equal protection clause was extended to all indigent
criminal defendants, as the Court recognized that it had a responsibility to pro-
vide equal justice to the poor. The holding of the court is best summarized in
these words:
The state is not free to produce such squalid discrimination. If it has a
general policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means
an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.3 6
27. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a
police court judgment which could not be reviewed under Kentucky law.
28. Cases cited note 25 supra.
29. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
30. 340 U.S. 206. (1951). -
31. Id. at'208.
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. Id. at 18. - -. "
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 22.
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Though limited factually to the right of an indigent defendant to a free tran-
script, the thrust of the decision was clear. The state cannot discriminate in its
judicial structure on the basis of poverty. It can not establish a system of crimi-
nal justice which, though non-discriminatory on its face, in fact works to deny
the indigent effective access to any of its phases. Burns v. kio37 made this
abundantly clear, holding that it was a violation of the equal protection and
due process clauses for the court to refuse to file appeal notices without the
requisite filing fee. In that decision the Court made clear that its major concern
was equal access and equal opportunity in every phase of criminal justice.
In 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright38 held that due process required the state
provide counsel to all indigent criminal defendants. On the same day, Douglas v.
California"0 was decided.
In the Douglas decision the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of due
process and of equal protection for the state to fail to appoint counsel on the
first appeal it grants as a matter of right.40 Under the California procedure, the
indigent requests the appointment of counsel. The appellate court then reviews
the case and determines whether the interests of justice would be served by the
appointment of an attorney, i.e., if in its judgment such appointment would be
of aid to the defendant or the court.41 The Supreme Court was concerned less
with the exact procedure than with the type of appeal the defendant received. If
he has sufficient funds, his attorney may examine the record and present the de-
fendant's case with brief and argument. If he lacks sufficient funds, the appellate
court must prejudge the merits of the defendant's cause to determine if the
appeal was worthy of a champion. In effect, the Court condemned other courts
for placing themselves in a position where their pre-determination of guilt could
influence their decision as to the defendant's constitutional rights.
There is lacking the equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift
for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man
has a meaningful appeal. 42
The essential elements of the decisions are that one person enjoys the benefit of
counsel and his knowledge and ability while another does not; and where the
record is not clear and inferentially where the area in issue is a developing one,
the poor man is severely disabled to the extent that he is denied both due process
37. 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
38. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. Douglas v. California, supra note 9.
40. Id. at 356.
41. Id. at 354.
42. Id. at 357.
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and equal protection by the state's judicial process 43 Douglas is therefore only
a factual variation of the Griffin decision of seven years before.
III. THE RULE-AS APPLIED IN MISSOURI
In Missouri the indigent criminal defendant has two avenues of appeal.4 4 He
may appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial merely by filing a notice of
appeal.45 When this method is utilized, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated
that it will consider all allegations of error preserved in the motion for new trial
which are sufficiently specific to comply with rule 27.20.46 Secondly, the de-
fendant may file only a brief in support of his appeal. Where the defendant has
counsel, or the court considers his pro se brief adequate, assignments of error made
in the motion for new trial not preserved in the brief are waived. 4 Where the
defendant files a pro se brief, which the court considers to be "obviously in-
adequate" or which pays little heed to the assignment of errors in his motion for
a new trial, the court will review all valid assignments of errors preserved under
rule 27.20 and will in addition utilize the brief to the fullest possible extent 8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered that the Missouri system pro-
vided for the appointment of counsel on appeal when in the exercise of its discre-
tion the trial court felt that it would aid the defendant 49 Research has failed to
disclose any reported cases in which the trial court acted to appoint counsel for
the defendant on his first appeal as a matter of right. At the onset, then, the Mis-
43. See generally, Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45
MINN. L. REV. 783 (1961); Clark, The Sixth Amendment and the Law of the
Land, 8 ST. L. L.J. 1 (1963); Simeone and Richardson, The Indigent and his Right
to Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 ST. L. LJ. 15 (1963); Mator, The Right
to be Provided Counsel: Variations On A Familiar Theme, 9 UTAH L. REv. 50
(1964).
44. For an excellent discussion of the Douglas rule and Missouri, see, Gerard,
The Right to Counsel on Appeal in Missouri: A Limited Tnquiry into the Factual
and Theoretical Underpinnings of Douglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 463.
45. Sup. Ct. Rule 28. Since the preparation of this article, the Missouri Su-
preme Court has moved to amend its court rules 27.26, 28.02, 28.05, and 29.01. The
text of these amendments are found in Advance Sheet No. 4, 409 S.W.2d, Feb. 7,
1967. The impact of the change will be dealt with fully in a forthcoming issue of the
Missoui LAW REVIEW.
It is sufficient to note here that the changes in Rule 28 will eliminate the
practice of appeal without briefs as the court indicates it will no longer consider
errors raised but not briefed. Further the change in Rule 27.26 provides that
indigents be given counsel thus eliminating the problem of the "first appeal as of
right" language in Douglas. The change in Rule 29.01 requires briefs by appointed
counsel and should move Missouri significantly forward in this area. The reader
should consider these new rules, noting that with them the result of the Donndll
and Bosler cases will be guaranteed to all indigents in this state and that with
them neither case would have been necessary.
46. Cases cited note 16, supra; State v. Bosler, supra note 5.
47. Sup. Ct. Rule 28.02; State v. Donnell, supra note 15; State v. Russell,
supra note 16; State v. Mace, supra note 16; State v. Smith, 365 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.
1963).
48. State v. Donnell, supra note 15; State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo.
1954).
49. Bosler v. Swenson, supra note 1 at 157.
1967]
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souri system is significantly different from that struck down in California. It is
also significantly different from the systems struck down in Lane v. Brown50
and in Draper v. Washington.51 In Missouri, the indigent defendant is not bur-
dened with a predetermination that his appeal is without sufficient merit to war-
rant counsel.
In the second appeal in the Donnell case on his denial of the rule 27.26 mo-
tion, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
It is probable that as large a percentage of criminal judgments have
been reversed in this court without counsel, as have been reversed with
counsel. Under these circumstances, we decline to hold, ex post facto, that
this defendant was deprived of any constitutional right because his trial
counsel did not brief and argue the case on appeal or because other counsel
was not appointed to do so.52
Professor Gerard of Washington University agrees with the factual conclusion
stated by the court.53 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also concurred,54
but held the Missouri procedure unconstitutional without even a requirement that
the defendant show actual prejudice. What then is it that makes this procedure
unconstitutional?
The indigent defendant normally has had trial counsel, who has prepared
defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant has then filed a pro se brief or
in effect throws himself upon the mercy of the court. There has been no contention
that the Missouri Supreme Court has been less than conscientious in attempting
to protect the defendant, yet the Douglas standard has been violated. The em-
phasis in Douglas must be placed on the Supreme Court's requirement that
every defendant have the advantage of an attorney's legal skills to search the
record, research the law and brief and argue the appeal. Under the Missouri
system, the indigent has had the aid of the attorney on appeal only in the
preparation of his motion for a new trial. Yet this aid is without much significance
since the attorney is, at that time, unable to make an actual search of the record
and must rely on his own memory. He is not able to discover the "hidden errors"
which may pervade the record, nor is he able to sufficiently research the law.
Thus, it is insignificant that in many criminal cases where the defendant has
counsel the defendant and his counsel have not filed a brief, but have allowed
the defendant to win or lose on the record and the brief of the attorney general.55
50. 372 U.S. 477 (1963). Under the Indiana system, the Public Defender was
vested with the duty to protect the indigent's rights. He had authority to order a
transcript and without such order, the defendant could not obtain a transcript.
Court rules permitted appeal from a denial of a writ of error, coram nobis, but
require a transcript to vest jurisdiction. This system was held to violate the equal
protection clause.
51. 372 U.S. 487 (1963). Under this system, the indigent must convince the
trial court that the appeal was not frivolous. Logically, if he could do so, he would
get a new trial. This was held to violate both due process and equal protection.
52. State v. Donnell, supra note 18.
53. Gerard, supra note 44.
54. Bosler v. Swenson, 363 F.2d 154, 157 (8th Cir. 1966).
55. Gerard, supra note 44.
[Vol. 32
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The insignificance is derived from the fact that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, as interpreted, only prohibits invidious discrimination as
between the rich and the poor.56 The discrimination in the Missouri system exists
because the indigent is not given the same opportunity as is the man of means,
regardless of the ultimate result. The rich man's counsel has had the opportunity
to search the record and has been able to make a value judgment based on all
relevant factors when he chooses not to brief or argue the case on appeal. The
indigent lacks this basic opportunity: to do otherwise. This creates the degree
of discrimination which violates the due process and equal protection clauses.
Logically, discrimination cannot be entirely eliminated from the appellate process,
for the man of means will have the ability to hire the more skilled attorney and
provide himself with investigators. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that
these differences are beyond the power of that Court to repair.57 This fact does
not cause it to restrain itself in protecting the individual by giving to the indigent
defendant substantially the same opportunity on appeal. The indigent may not
receive the best lawyer available, but he will have a man whose skill and train-
ing make him better able than the defendant to ascertain upon what basis the
defendant should proceed.
For there can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man en-
joys depends "on the amount of money he has."58
There are additional reasons why Missouri's procedure must fail. First, the appeal
from a motion for a new trial provides no guarantee that there will be a full
use of the attorney's skills and is subject to abuse.59 Second, the American judicial
system is based upon an adversary system. Historically the judicial function
has been that of the impartial judge, not the advocate. 60 As noted in Powell v.
Alabama:
But how can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively dis-
charge the obligations of counsel for the accused?0 1
The court lacks the ability to sufficiently research the entire record and the re-
sponsibility necessary to insure the defendant his rights. The functions of the
court and of the advocate are wholly distinct. Making the court an advocate de-
prives it of its objectivity.62 This was the recognized situation in England where
the accused was not, until 1836, allowed counsel.
The flimsy pretence, that the courts are to be counsel for the prisoner
will only heighten our indignation at the practice; for it is apparent to
56. Griffn v. Illinois, supra note 32.
57. Id. at 21; Douglas v. California, svpra note 9.
58. Douglas v. California, supra note 9, at 355; Griffin v. Illinois, supra note
32, at 19.
59. Gerard, supra note 45.
60. Clark, supra note 43; Powell v. Alabama, supra note 21.
61. Powell v. Alabama, supra note 21 at 61.
62. Articles cited note 43 and 44 swpra; Donnell v. Swenson, 258 F. Supp. 317,
324 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
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the least consideration, that a court can never furnish a person accused of
a crime with the advice and assistance necessary to make his defense.63
Third, the Missouri procedure is complicated because the attorney general briefs
each criminal appeal, generally on all issues raised in the motion for a new trial
where the defendant has not filed a brief, or when the attorney general feels that
the appellate court may consider all of the allegations in the motion for a new
trial. In addition, the attorney general cannot confess error and, therefore, argues
for affirmance in every instance.64 This raises the likelihood that too much re-
liance will be placed on the work of the attorney general's office, which is re-
quired by judicial policy to be prejudicial. Thus, the court has deprived itself of
the objectivity necessary to protect an individual's constitutional rights without
becoming entangled in what may be his obvious guilt. The usual Missouri pro-
cedure would be but a one-half adversary system on the appellate level.
Our American system of jurisprudence is based upon the fundamental
assumption that the rights of the innocent must be constitutionally pro-
tected and safeguarded by an adversary system of criminal law administra-
tion, and that such a system is a viable one only if the contesting parties
are represented by competent counsel. Anything less would convert our
adversary system of criminal justice into an inquisitorial system unknown
to American jurisprudence.65
IV. RImoAcTivrr
Bosler held only that the Douglas decision was to be applied to cases not
yet final and to those pending on review.0 6 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that finality means that there has been a judgment, that all available appeals
have been exhausted, and that time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed.67
This principle, that the decisions of the Court are to be applied to all cases not
yet final, is not new, and has been consistently applied except in cases in which
the court has denominated the decision to be purely prospective so that it does
not even apply to the parties before the court, or to be purely retrospective.68
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was on familiar constitutional grounds when
it held that the Douglas standard was to be applied to the Bosler conviction
since the Douglas decision was handed down three weeks prior to the affirmation
of Bosler's conviction. The problem in Donnell is different. Was the principle in
the Douglas decision to be given absolute retroactive effect so that it would en-
compass the 1960 conviction of the defendant Donnell? The United States District
63. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 63 (1932); Mr. Justice Sutherland quot-
ing Zephaniah Swift.
64. See Gerard, supra note 44. This is a policy of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, the propriety of which is subject to extreme doubt.
65. Donnell v. Swenson, supra note 62, at 326.
66. Bosler v. Swenson, 363 F.2d 154, 158 (8th Cir. 1966).
67. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
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Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the answer must be yes.
On eight different occasions, the Supreme Court of the United States has so indi-
cated6 9 and nine lower federal courts have agreed.70 The best indication of the
Supreme Court's attitude is Smith zt. Crouse,71 a 1964 decision. The defendant had
been convicted in 1960. In 1963, he applied to the Kansas Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus alleging violation of his constitutional rights because the
court originally failed to appoint counsel for him on appeal. The Kansas Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's contentions, noting that only the United States
Supreme Court could give an authoritative decision as to retroactivity.72 In 1964,
in a per curlam decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Kansas court, citing only DouglasY3 Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on
the ground that he felt that the question of the retroactive application of the
Douglal case should be given plenary consideration.1 4 It was made abundantly
clear that the majority opinion was applying the principle retroactively.
In the light of Douglas's recognition of an indigent's "absolute" right to
counsel on appeal and considering the dissenting justices' position that
the apposite constitutional clause is the Due Process Clause, we hold that
Douglas must be applied retrospectively. 5
Because of the response of the United States Supreme Court to the position of
the Kansas court in 1964, there seems to have been little doubt as to the outcome
on this question. However, the Smith. case and the seven other per curam decisions
agreeing with it were decided before three cases involving retroactivity in crimi-
nal cases: Linkletter v. Walker,1 6 Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott,7" and
69. Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964); Ruark v. Colorado, 378 U.S. 585
(1964); Cox v. State, 376 U.S. 191 (1964); Shockey v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 22
(1963); Ausbie v. California, 375 U.S. 24 (1963); Herrera v. Heinze, 375 U.S. 26
(1963); Tabb v. California, 375 U.S. 27 (1963); Daegeie v. Kansas, 375 U.S. 1
(1963). On March 14, 1967, the Supreme Court remanded two cases for considera-
tion in the light of Bosler, Tehan, infra note 77, and Eskridge, infra note 79.
Tettamble v. Missouri, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3320 (U.S. March 14, 1967); Deckard v.
Warden, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3321 (U.S. March 14, 1967). As in the Smith case, it
would appear that the court is giving Missouri another chance to reach the result
of retroactive application independently.
70. Puckett v. North Carolina, 343 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1965); Magee v. Pey-
ton, 343 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1965); Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965);
Chase v. Page, 343 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel, Mitchell v.
Fay, 241 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Miller v. Okla., 240 F. Supp. 263 (E.D.
Okla. 1965); Kessinger v. Okla., 239 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Okla. 1965); Wright v.
Bailey, 228 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.N.C. 1964); Spaulding v. Taylor, 234 F. Supp.
147 (D. Kan. 1964).
71. 378 U.S. 584 (1964). For a representative state court decision holding
Douglas retroactive, see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1,
12, 213 Atl. 2d 613, 624 (1965).
72. Smith v. Crouse, 192 Kan. 171, 386 P.2d 295 (1963).
73. Smith v. Crouse, supra note 72.
74. Id. at 585.
75. Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764, 776 (5th Cir. 1965).
76. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
77. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
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Johnson v. New Jersey.78 Further, the case of Eskridge v. Washington State Board
of Prison Terms and Paroles79 is particularly relevant to this discussion.
The 1958 Eskridge decision held that the Griffln case was to be applied retro-
actively to a 1935 murder conviction.80 Logically, this case is of particular im-
portance since it is contended that the Douglas decision was merely a factual
variation on the theme set in Griffin. In Eskridge, the Court did not bother to
discuss retroactivity since the invidious discrimination condemned there was held
to substantially affect the defendant's rights on appeal, and therefore the de-
fendant was denied a fair and equal appeal, a denial of equal justice which can
be corrected only by a new appeal.
Linkletter8l solidified a rule previously announced by Mr. Justice Cardozo,
that the Constitution neither requires nor prohibits retroactive application of any
decision.8 2 In that decision, the Court noted that it had in the past made deci-
sions both absolutely retroactive and absolutely prospective without extended
discussion, and then set out relevant considerations which were decisive of its
decision. The courts of the nation were instructed to look to the merits of each
case, "by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect,
and whether retroactive operation will further or retard it operation. ' 8 3 Since
Mapp v. Ohio 84 was to be an effective deterrent to police action, its purpose would
not be advanced, nor would reparation be furthered by its retroactive application.
In addition, the Court felt that its past decisions had been so heavily relied on
that the administration of justice would be impeded if it were retroactive.85
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott88 concerned the rule of Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,8 7 which held that commenting on the failure of the defendant to testify in
criminal cases was a violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimi-
nation. This decision accepted Linkletter as its starting point and utilized the
same considerations to test whether or not the rule should be applied retroactively. 88
In Tehan particular emphasis was placed upon the administration of justice in
relation to the prior decision of Twining v. New Jersey.89 The court concluded
that the purpose of the rule was to protect a complex of values and that no
purpose would be served by retroactive application in relation to the burden im-
posed upon the judicial system of the statesP
78. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
79. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
80. Ibid. The court stated at 216, "The conclusion of the trial judge that
there was no reversable error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for
the right to full appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who
can afford the expenses of a transcript." The word "counsel" fits equally well.
81. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 76.
82. Ibid.; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., supra note
67, at 364.
83. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 76, at 628; also at 627.
84. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961).
85. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 76 at 630.
86. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra note 77.
87. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
88. Tehan v. U.S. ex rel. Shott, supra note 77, at 407.
89. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
90. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra note 77, at 415, 416.
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COMMENTS
Johnson v. New Jersey91 involved the retroactive application of Escobedo92
and Miranda.93 It was decided that those cases were to have only limited retro-
active application as of the date of the decision in Escobedo. Joknson does not em-
ploy any new or different tests for the determination of the question, but is con-
cerned with questions of degree as between the problems involved.9 4
The first consideration to which the Court requires attention is the purpose
of the rule. As previously discussed, the purpose of Douglas is direct: to prevent
invidious discrimination based on a man's financial status and to thus accord
to all the same opportunity on appeal.
Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the
law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
American court.' 95
The rule of Douglas is designed to destroy the discrimination and unconstitutional
line drawn between the rich and the poor.
The purpose of the constitutional rule that guarantees counsel in both the
trial and the appellate court in criminal proceedings is to make certain
that one who "lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense" be afforded "the guiding hand of counsel at every step of
the proceedings against him".. ..6
The second consideration is whether the retroactive application of the rule
will further or retard its operations. The distinction here seems to be whether
the rule or standards with which the decision is involved protect the integrity of
the fact finding or guilt certification process, or whether the rule is designed as an
effective deterrent to police action. Linkletter clearly indicated that the exclusionary
rule was designed as a deterrent. In Teian, the Court indicated that the complex
of values which lay behind the privilege of the fifth amendment do not relate to
the protection of the innocent. Johnson, while in fact concerning itself mainly with
the problems of administration, indicated that the Escobedo and Miranda rules
likewise are not so much concerned with the integrity of the evidence collected as
with the police practices involved. On the other hand, Griffin and Gideon, both
dealing with the problems of justice and indigency, have been applied retroactively.
Unlike the Mapp situation, it is not too late for reparation in Douglas situation.
Retroactive application of this rule will further the purpose of the rule and will
allow all those imprisoned without the benefit of counsel on appeal to stand be-
fore the bar of justice in equality. The retroactive application of the rule will
cleanse the judicial system of vestiges of invidious discrimination.
Perhaps the major consideration is the effect of the rule on the administration
91. Johnson v. New Jersey, supra note 78.
92. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
93. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. ; 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
94. For a more detailed discussion of this area, see Donnell v. Swenson, supra
note 62, at 328.
95. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956); see generally, Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Cole v.
Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1945).
96. Donnell v. Swenson, supra note 62, at 326.
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of justice within the state. Donnell limits its inquiry to the effects in Missouri.
Logically a hardship will result, but that hardship weighs only slightly in the
balance of justice. In Missouri, with the provisions of article V, section 6 of the
Missouri Constitution, which allows the transfer of judicial personnel by the
supreme court, and because of the general forward looking treatment of criminals
by the state, the effect on the administration of justice should be sufficiently miti-
gated to erase this as a major consideration. It should be noted that in Kansas
and Illinois the opinions of the courts on the new appeal with counsel have not
noted any particular hardships.9 7
In 1963, as of the date of Douglas, only eleven states had statutory provisions
specifically providing for counsel on appeal by indigents9 This compares with the
fact that only six states did not refuse the right to comment on the failure to
testify, as noted in the Tekam decision.99 In Tehan, there was no retroactivity. In
Douglas, there should be. The prime difference is that the history of the Douglas
standard indicates that with slight exception, the thirty-nine states which did not
so provide did so at their own risk, for there was lacking United States Supreme
Court authority on which they could base the contrary practice. In 1956, the
Supreme Court, in On.ffin, spoke for the first time in this area and gave to the
states a concrete indication as to the future course of their decisions, as they had
done in the decision of Wolf v. Colorado.100 The states did not take the hint in
Wolf in general, nor did they take it in Gri rln. Where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the interests of the states, their pride, and their procedure, must
take a second seat, else we fall again into the trap which fails to distingush the
individual's rights from his guilt.
Therefore, under the considerations outlined by the court in Linkletter and
supported in Tekan and in Jolhnson, there is no reason why Douglas should not
be applied retroactively in all instances. The theory and the principles involved
correspond to those which have been held to warrant similar application, and they
apply well to the tests laid down in the above recent decisions. There is nothing
present in those three decisions which would lead the Supreme Court to reverse
their original pronouncement of Smit v. Crouse.10o
Donnell reasons along the identical lines and reaches the same result, for in
spite of the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, to do less would be to ratify an
invidious discriminaton and leave those potentially affected without relief, a situa-
tion intolerable under the adversary system of American justice.
JOHN L. OLIVER, J,*
97. State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 (1964); People v. Shockey, 30
Ill.2d 147, 195 N.E.2d 703 (1964); see authorities collected, Donnell v. Swenson,
supra note 62, at 332.
98. ALA. CODE. Title 15, § 382(1) and (5) and (58); ALASKA CRIM. R. 39 a
and b; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-81; GA. CODE ANNOT. § 27-3001(a); HAWAII REV.
LAws § 253-5 (Supp. 1960); KA. GEN. STAT. § 62-1304(b) (Supp. 1961); MD.
R. CUM. P. 719(b); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1803; ORE. Rxv. STAT. § 138, 820; Wis.
STAT. ANNOT. § 957.26(3); Wyo. CoMp. STAT. ANNOT. § 7-8.
99. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra note 77, at 417.
100. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
101. Donnell v. Swenson, 258 F. Supp. 317, 331 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
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